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Abstract
Hirschfeldt and Jockusch (2016) introduced a two-player game in
which winning strategies for one or the other player precisely corre-
spond to implications and non-implications between Π12 principles over
ω-models of RCA0. They also introduced a version of this game that
similarly captures provability over RCA0. We generalize and extend
this game-theoretic framework to other formal systems, and establish
a certain compactness result that shows that if an implication Q→ P
between two principles holds, then there exists a winning strategy
that achieves victory in a number of moves bounded by a number in-
dependent of the specific run of the game. This compactness result
generalizes an old proof-theoretic fact noted by H. Wang (1981), and
has applications to the reverse mathematics of combinatorial princi-
ples.
We also demonstrate how this framework leads to a new kind of
analysis of the logical strength of mathematical problems that re-
fines both that of reverse mathematics and that of computability-
theoretic notions such as Weihrauch reducibility, allowing for a kind
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of fine-structural comparison between Π12 principles that has both
computability-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and can help us
distinguish between these, for example by showing that a certain use
of a principle in a proof is “purely proof-theoretic”, as opposed to
relying on its computability-theoretic strength.
We give examples of this analysis to a number of principles at
the level of BΣ02, uncovering new differences between their logical
strengths.
1 Introduction
Reverse mathematics gives us a way to compare the relative strength of the-
orems by establishing implications and nonimplications over a weak subsys-
tem of second-order arithmetic, typically RCA0, which corresponds roughly
to computable mathematics. (We will assume some familiarity with reverse
mathematics and computability theory. Standard resources in these areas in-
clude [31] and [32], respectively.) In many cases, nonimplications over RCA0
are proved using ω-models, i.e., models of RCA0 with standard first-order
part. We say that P is ω-reducible to Q, and write P 6ω Q, if every ω-model
of RCA0 + Q is a model of P.
Implication over RCA0 and ω-reducibility are not fine enough for some
purposes, so other notions of computability-theoretic reduction between the-
orems have been extensively studied. These are particularly well-adapted to
the following class of theorems, which includes a large proportion of those
that have been studied in reverse mathematics: A Π12-problem is a sentence
∀X [Θ(X) → ∃Y Ψ(X, Y )] of second-order arithmetic such that Θ and Ψ
are arithmetic. The term “problem” reflects a computability-theoretic view
that sees such a sentence as a process of finding a suitable Y given X . In
line with this view, we say that an instance of this problem is an X ⊆ ω
such that Θ(X) holds, and a solution to this problem is a Y ⊆ ω such that
Ψ(X, Y ) holds.
For example, the following versions of Ramsey’s Theorem are Π12-problems
that have been extensively studied in reverse mathematics and computability
theory, and will be useful sources of examples for us as well. (We often
state Π12-problems in ways that make mention of objects other than natural
numbers and sets of natural numbers. We assume these are coded in an
appropriate way. For combinatorial objects like the ones below, these codings
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are straightforward and do not affect the analysis of these problems.)
Definition 1.1. For a set X , let [X ]n be the collection of n-element subsets
of X . A k-coloring of [X ]n is a map c : [X ]n → k. A coloring of [X ]2 is
stable if limy∈X c(x, y) exists for all x ∈ X . A set H ⊆ X is homogeneous
for c : [X ]n → k if there is an i such that c(s) = i for all s ∈ [H ]n. A
set L ⊆ X is limit-homogeneous for c : [X ]2 → k if there is an i such that
limy∈L c(x, y) = i for all x ∈ L.
1. RTnk : Every k-coloring of [N]
n has an infinite homogeneous set.
2. RTn<∞: ∀k RT
n
k .
3. RT: ∀n ∀k RTnk .
4. SRT2k: Every stable k-coloring of [N]
2 has an infinite homogeneous set.
5. D2k: Every stable k-coloring of [N]
2 has an infinite limit-homogeneous
set.
It is well-known that RTnk and RT
n
<∞ are equivalent to ACA0 for each
n > 3 (we always assume k > 2), while RT1k is provable in RCA0. (We will
discuss RT1<∞ and RT below. For more on the computability theory and
reverse mathematics of these principles, see [16].) The question of whether
SRT
2
2 implies RT
2
2 motivated a great deal of research since being raised by
Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman [8]. Chong, Slaman, and Yang [10] showed
that RCA0 0 SRT
2
2 → RT
2
2, with a proof that made essential use of non-ω-
models. Recently, Monin and Patey [24] have finally shown that RT22 
ω
SRT
2
2. The relationship between SRT
2
2 and D
2
2 is also interesting, and will be
discussed in Section 6.
Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17] gave characterizations of both P 6ω Q and
RCA0 ⊢ Q → P for Π12-problems P and Q in terms of winning strategies in
certain games. In this paper, we study further aspects of the latter charac-
terization and generalizations of it, in particular establishing a compactness
theorem that shows that certain winning strategies can always be chosen to
win in a number of moves bounded by a number independent of the instance
of P being considered. As explained below, this theorem can be seen as a gen-
eralization of a metatheorem about ACA0. This metatheorem has been used,
for instance, to translate computability-theoretic results of Jockusch [21] into
a proof that ACA0 0 RT.
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The difference between the two game-theoretic characterizations in [17]
is that for ω-reducibility, the games are played over the standard natu-
ral numbers, while for provability over RCA0 they are played over possibly
nonstandard models of Σ01-PA (the first-order part of RCA0). We hope to
show in this paper that there is a rich theory to be obtained by general-
izing computability-theoretic reductions between Π12-problems to models of
subsystems of second-order arithmetic with possibly nonstandard first-order
parts, and to begin its systematic development. In particular, this theory al-
lows us to conduct a fine-structural comparison between such problems that
has both computability-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and can help
us distinguish between these, for example by showing that a certain use of a
principle in a proof is “purely proof-theoretic”, as opposed to relying on its
computability-theoretic strength.
Computable reducibility and Weihrauch reducibility are two of the most
widely-studied notions of computability-theoretic reducibility between Π12-
problems. The latter (in a more general form) has a long history, particularly
in computable analysis (see e.g. [5]), while the former was introduced by
Dzhafarov [12].
Definition 1.2. Let P and Q be Π12-problems.
We say that P is computably reducible to Q, and write P 6c Q, if for every
instance X of P, there is an X-computable instance X̂ of Q such that, for
every solution Ŷ to X̂ , there is an X ⊕ Ŷ -computable solution to X .
We say that P is Weihrauch reducible to Q, and write P 6W Q, if there
are Turing functionals Φ and Ψ such that, for every instance X of P, the
set X̂ = ΦX is an instance of Q, and for every solution Ŷ to X̂ , the set
Y = ΨX⊕Ŷ is a solution to X .
These two reducibilities allow us to use only a single instance of Q in solv-
ing an instance of P. To generalize these notions to allow multiple instances
of Q to be used, Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17] defined the following game.
Definition 1.3. Let P and Q be Π12-problems. The reduction game G(Q→
P) is a two-player game played according to the following rules.
(1) If at any point a player cannot make a move, the opponent wins.
(2) If one of the players wins, the game ends.
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(3) On the first move, Player 1 plays an instance X0 of P. Then Player
2 either plays an X0-computable solution to X0 and wins, or plays an
X0-computable instance Y1 of Q.
(4) For n > 1, on the nth move, Player 1 plays a solution Xn−1 to the
instance Yn−1 of Q. Then Player 2 either plays an (X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Xn−1)-
computable solution to X0 and wins, or plays an (X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Xn−1)-
computable instance Yn of Q.
(5) If the game never ends then Player 1 wins.
A winning strategy for Player 2 in this game is a form of generalized com-
putable reduction. Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17] showed that if P 6ω Q then
Player 2 has a winning strategy for G(Q→ P), while otherwise Player 1 has
a winning strategy for G(Q → P), so generalized computable reducibility is
actually the same as ω-reducibility. They then defined an analogous notion
of generalized Weihrauch reducibility, where P 6gW Q if Player 2 has a uni-
formly computable winning strategy for G(Q → P). (See [17] for the details
of this definition.) Neumann and Pauly [26] gave an equivalent definition in
terms of an operator ⋄ on the Weihrauch degrees. (See also [36] for some
more recent discussion of, and results about, the ⋄ operator.)
We can generalize the notions of instance and solution of a Π12-problem
P ≡ ∀X [Θ(X) → ∃Y Ψ(X, Y )] to possibly nonstandard structures in the
language of first-order arithmetic in a natural way. We denote the languages
of first- and second-order arithmetic by L1 and L2, respectively. Let M be
an L1-structure. We denote the domain of M by |M |. For S ⊆ |M |, we
denote the L2-structure with first-order part M and second-order part S by
(M,S). For an L1-structure M , anM-instance of P is an X ⊆ |M | such that
(M, {X})  Θ(X), and a solution to this instance is a Y ⊆ |M | such that
(M, {X, Y })  Ψ(X, Y ).
Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17, Section 4.5] noted that reduction games
can be extended to possibly nonstandard countable models of Σ01-PA (i.e.,
first-order parts of models of RCA0), with ∆
0
1-definability playing the role of
computability as follows. ForX0, . . . , Xn ⊆ |M |, we denote byM [X0, . . . , Xn]
the L2-structure with first-order part M and second-order part consisting of
all X ⊆ |M | that are ∆01-definable over |M | ∪ {X0, . . . , Xn}, which means
that there are Σ01 formulas ϕ0(x) and ϕ1(x) with parameters from |M | ∪
{X0, . . . , Xn} such that (M, {X0, . . . , Xn})  ∀x (ϕ0(x)↔ ¬ϕ1(x)) and X =
{n ∈ |M| : (M, {X0, . . . , Xn})  ϕ0(n)}.
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Definition 1.4. Let P and Q be Π12-problems. The RCA0-reduction game
GRCA0(Q→ P) is a two-player game played according to the following rules.
(1) If at any point a player cannot make a move, the opponent wins.
(2) If one of the players wins, the game ends.
(3) On the first move, Player 1 plays a countable L1-structure M and anM-
instance X0 of P such that M [X0]  RCA0. Then Player 2 either plays
a solution to X0 in M [X0] and wins, or plays an M-instance Y1 of Q in
M [X0].
(4) For n > 1, on the nth move, Player 1 plays a solution Xn−1 to the
instance Yn−1 of Q such that M [X0, . . . , Xn−1]  RCA0. Then Player 2
either plays a solution to X0 in M [X0, . . . , Xn−1] and wins, or plays an
M-instance Yn of Q in M [X0, . . . , Xn−1].
(5) If the game never ends then Player 1 wins.
This definition allows us to capture provability over RCA0 in terms of
winning strategies.
Proposition 1.5 (Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17]). Let P and Q be Π12-prob-
lems. If RCA0 ⊢ Q→ P then Player 2 has a winning strategy for GRCA0(Q→
P). Otherwise, Player 1 has a winning strategy for GRCA0(Q→ P).
The proof of this proposition is essentially the same as that of the analo-
gous result for games over the standard natural numbers and ω-reducibility
in [17, Proposition 4.2]. We will prove a stronger version in Proposition 2.4.
However, it might be that the above definition is not quite the best one.
In Section 2, we will discuss a modified game. We will define it for arbitrary
subsystems of second-order arithmetic, but in the case of RCA0, the modified
game ĜRCA0(Q → P) is defined as above, except that on its first move,
Player 1 must play not only a countable L1-structure M , but a model M
of RCA0 with countable first-order part (but possibly uncountable second-
order part); and from then on, its moves X0, X1, . . . must all come from
M. This game makes intuitive sense in that if Player 1 is trying to claim
that RCA0 0 Q→ P, then it should be prepared to propose a model of RCA0
within which to witness this fact. This idea was not noticed in [17] because in
the ω-model case after which the original RCA0-reduction game was modeled,
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there is really no issue, since Player 1 always automatically plays within a
particular model of RCA0, namely (ω,P(ω)), where P(ω) is the full power set
of ω. (For a nonstandard model M , of course, the full power set will include
a cut, so we cannot add it to M to obtain a model of RCA0.)
As we will see in Section 2, Proposition 1.5 still holds for this modified
game, indeed with the same proof. But we will also be able to prove a stronger
version that shows that a certain kind of compactness theorem holds in this
case: As shown in [17], for a game G(Q → P) over the standard natural
numbers, it is possible that Player 2 has a winning strategy but there is no n
such that Player 2 has a winning strategy that is guaranteed to win in at most
n many moves. As we will show in Section 3, for our modified games over
possibly nonstandard models, this will no longer be the case, which makes
sense given that these games capture notions of provability, and a proof of
Q→ P is a finite object.
Theorem 1.6. Let P and Q be Π12-problems. If RCA0 ⊢ Q→ P then there is
an n such that Player 2 has a winning strategy for ĜRCA0(Q→ P) that ensures
victory in at most n many moves. Otherwise, Player 1 has a winning strategy
for ĜRCA0(Q→ P).
We do not know whether the first part of this result holds for the game
GRCA0(Q→ P) as well.
Theorem 1.6, whose proof will in fact use the compactness theorem for
first-order logic, can be seen as a generalization of the following fact, which
appears in Wang [35], where it is said that it is “almost certainly a known
theorem in proof theory.” For a model-theoretic proof using compactness
due to Jockusch, see [16, Section 6.3].
Theorem 1.7 (see Wang [35]). Let P ≡ ∀X [Θ(X) → ∃Y Ψ(X, Y )] be a
Π12-problem. If P is provable in ACA0, then there is an n ∈ ω such that ACA0
proves ∀X [Θ(X) → ∃Y ∈ Σ0,Xn Ψ(X, Y )].
As mentioned above, this theorem implies for instance that ACA0 0 RT,
because Jockusch [21] showed that for each n > 2, there is an instance of
RT
n
2 (and hence of RT) with no Σ
0
n solutions. On the other hand, Jockusch
also showed that every instance of RTnk has a Π
0
n solution, which implies that
every ω-model of ACA0 is a model of RT.
Notice that if we take Q to be the statement that for each X , the Turing
jump X ′ exists, then the provability of P in ACA0 is equivalent to the prov-
ability of Q→ P in RCA0. As part of the proof of Theorem 1.6 in Section 3,
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we will prove a theorem that is a direct generalization of Theorem 1.7. Mon-
talba´n and Shore [25] also generalized this theorem, in a different way that
is particularly suited to problems where each instance has a unique solution,
and is indeed equivalent to ours in that case, but is not strong enough for
our purposes.
As an example of the application of Theorem 1.6, we will obtain a simple
proof that RT22 does not imply RT
2
<∞, even over RCA0 together with all Π
1
1
formulas true over the natural numbers.
Let Γ be a class of formulas. Recall that IΓ is the axiom scheme stating
that induction holds for formulas in Γ. Recall also that the Γ-bounding axiom
scheme BΓ consists of all formulas of the form
∀n [∀i < n ∃k ϕ(i, k) → ∃b∀i < n ∃k 6 b ϕ(i, k)]
for each formula ϕ in Γ such that b is not free in ϕ. Note that ϕ is allowed
to have parameters. The system RCA0 + BΣ
0
2, which is strictly intermediate
between RCA0 and RCA0 + IΣ
0
2, has been particularly prominent in reverse
mathematics. (In most cases, it is actually BΠ01 that is used, but BΠ
0
1 and
BΣ02 are easily seen to be equivalent over RCA0.) For example, Hirst [19]
showed that RT1<∞ is equivalent to BΣ
0
2 over RCA0.
In Section 4, we will consider computable winning strategies and the no-
tion of generalized Weihrauch reducibility over possibly nonstandard models.
There is an intriguing connection here with analogs of RCA0 for intuitionistic
logic, first noted in work of Kuyper [23]. We will comment on this connection
briefly in that section, but leave further work in this direction to a follow-up
paper. In Section 5 we will consider single-instance reducibilities such as
computable and Weihrauch reducibility in this context. Our results through-
out will apply not only to RCA0 but also to other systems at the level of
computable mathematics, including extensions of RCA0 by first-order princi-
ples, such as RCA0+ IΣ
0
n or RCA0+BΣ
0
n, and also restrictions such as RCA
∗
0,
which roughly speaking is RCA0 with Σ
0
1-induction replaced by Σ
0
0-induction.
In Sections 6 and 7, we will undertake a case study in the analysis of math-
ematical principles under Weihrauch and generalized Weihrauch reducibility
over possibly nonstandard models, by considering several principles that are
equivalent over RCA0 to Σ
0
2-bounding. We will see how this framework al-
lows us to uncover some hitherto hidden differences between quite similar
principles.
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2 Reduction games and provability
In this section, we generalize Definition 1.4 from RCA0 to other axiom sys-
tems Γ, modify it as described above, and prove a more general version of
Proposition 1.5. Of course, we cannot in general require Player 1’s moves
to result in models of Γ, since it might be the case that no structure of the
form M [X0, . . . , Xn−1] is a model of Γ. However, we can require that Player
1 never make it impossible for the model built by its moves to be extendable
to a model of Γ. Say that an L2-structure M is consistent with Γ if it is
contained in a model N of Γ with the same first-order part. (Note that ifM
is countable, then we can require N to be countable as well without changing
the notion.)
The systems Γ for which we will prove that winning strategies for the fol-
lowing game correspond to provability over Γ will actually have the property
that every structure consistent with Γ is in fact a model of Γ. The reason
we give the definition in the more general setting is that, when analyzing the
provability of Q → P in Γ, we will also want to consider games over Γ + Q.
We will see that doing so makes no difference in the case of general winning
strategies, but does in the case of computable winning strategies.
Definition 2.1. Let Γ be a set of L2-formulas and let P and Q be Π
1
2-
problems. The Γ-reduction game GΓ(Q → P) is a two-player game played
according to the following rules.
(1) If at any point a player cannot make a move, the opponent wins.
(2) If one of the players wins, the game ends.
(3) On the first move, Player 1 plays a countable L1-structure M and an
M-instance X0 of P such thatM [X0] is consistent with Γ. Then Player 2
either plays a solution to X0 in M [X0] and wins, or plays an M-instance
Y1 of Q in M [X0].
(4) For n > 1, on the nth move, Player 1 plays a solutionXn−1 to the instance
Yn−1 of Q such that M [X0, . . . , Xn−1] is consistent with Γ. Then Player
2 either plays a solution to X0 in M [X0, . . . , Xn−1] and wins, or plays an
M-instance Yn of Q in M [X0, . . . , Xn−1].
(5) If the game never ends then Player 1 wins.
We modify this game as follows.
9
Definition 2.2. Let Γ be a set of L2-formulas and let P and Q be Π
1
2-
problems. The modified Γ-reduction game ĜΓ(Q → P) is a two-player game
played according to the following rules.
(1) If at any point a player cannot make a move, the opponent wins.
(2) If one of the players wins, the game ends.
(3) On the first move, Player 1 plays a model (M,S) of Γ withM countable,
and an M-instance X0 of P in S. Then Player 2 either plays a solution
to X0 in M [X0] and wins, or plays an M-instance Y1 of Q in M [X0].
(4) For n > 1, on the nth move, Player 1 plays a solution Xn−1 to the
instance Yn−1 of Q in S. Then Player 2 either plays a solution to
X0 in M [X0, . . . , Xn−1] and wins, or plays an M-instance Yn of Q in
M [X0, . . . , Xn−1].
(5) If the game never ends then Player 1 wins.
If Γ is consistent with ∆01-comprehension and Γ 0 Q → P, then Player 1
has winning strategies in both of these games (as we will see in the second
part of the proof of Proposition 2.4 below), but we cannot hope in general
that the same is the case for Player 2 if Γ ⊢ Q→ P, because of that player’s
restriction to playing computably. However, if Γ is sufficiently well-behaved,
then this is no longer an obstacle, and we can obtain a generalization of
Proposition 1.5 with essentially the same proof. The key property here is
that all axioms of Γ other than ∆01-comprehension be Π
1
1. Of course, this
property holds of RCA0, as well as commonly-studied first-order extensions
such as RCA0 + IΣ
0
n and RCA0 + BΣ
0
n, and restrictions such as RCA
∗
0.
In the proof, we will actually use the following properties, but it is not
difficult to show that they are equivalent to saying that Γ is a consistent
set of L2-formulas consisting of ∆
0
1-comprehension together with a set of Π
1
1
formulas.
1. Γ is a consistent set of L2-formulas that includes all instances of ∆
0
1-
comprehension.
2. If an L2-structure is closed under ∆
0
1-definability and is consistent with
Γ, then it is a model of Γ.
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3. For every countable L1-structure M and X0, X1, . . . ⊆ |M |, if each
M [X0, . . . , Xn] is a model of Γ, then so is their union M [X0, X1, . . .].
The following simple but important result follows from these properties.
Lemma 2.3. Let Γ be a consistent extension of ∆01-comprehension by Π
1
1
formulas. Let P and Q be Π12-problems. Let M be an L1-structure and
X0, . . . , Xn ⊆ |M | be sets set such that M [X0, . . . , Xn] is consistent with
Γ. If Γ ⊢ Q → P, then either every instance of P in M [X0, . . . , Xn] has a
solution in M [X0, . . . , Xn], or else Q has an instance in M [X0, . . . , Xn].
Proof. Fix M and X0, . . . , Xn. Since the L2-structure M [X0, . . . , Xn] is
closed under ∆01-comprehension it is in fact a model of Γ, as noted above.
If Q has no instance in M [X0, . . . , Xn], then M [X0, . . . , Xn] trivially satisfies
Q. Hence, by assumption, M [X0, . . . , Xn] also satisfies P. So every instance
of P in M [X0, . . . , Xn] has a solution in M [X0, . . . , Xn].
Later on, when we prove a generalization of Theorem 1.6, we will also
need to assume that Γ is strong enough to prove the existence of a universal
Σ01 formula, but of course that holds of all systems we normally study in
reverse mathematics.
We should also expect Γ and Γ+Q to behave similarly here, since there is
no difference between saying that Γ ⊢ Q→ P and saying that Γ+Q ⊢ Q→ P.
This fact will be of interest below when we consider computable winning
strategies.
Proposition 1.5 can be generalized as follows. Notice that of the four
games GΓ(Q→ P), GΓ+Q(Q→ P), ĜΓ(Q→ P), and ĜΓ+Q(Q→ P), the first
is the hardest one for Player 2 to win, while the last is the hardest one for
Player 1 to win.
Proposition 2.4. Let Γ be a consistent extension of ∆01-comprehension by
Π11 formulas. Let P and Q be Π
1
2-problems. If Γ ⊢ Q → P then Player 2
has a winning strategy for GΓ(Q→ P) (and hence for each of the three other
games above). Otherwise, Player 1 has a winning strategy for ĜΓ+Q(Q→ P)
(and hence for each of the three other games above).
Proof. If Γ ⊢ Q → P then Player 2 can play according to the following
strategy. Let M be the L1-structure played by Player 1 on its first move. At
the nth move, if Player 2 has a legal winning move, Player 2 makes that move.
Otherwise, it lets Yn,0, Yn,1, . . . be all M-instances of Q in M [X0, . . . , Xn−1],
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where X0, . . . , Xn−1 are Player 1’s first nmoves. For the least pair 〈m, i〉 with
m 6 n for which Player 2 has not yet acted, it then acts by playing Ym,i (to
which Player 1 must reply with a solution to Ym,i). Note that Player 2 always
has some legal move, by Lemma 2.3. Suppose Player 2 never has a winning
move, and Player 1 never fails to have a legal move. By our assumptions
on Γ, each M [X0, . . . , Xn−1] is a model of Γ, and hence so is their union
M [X0, X1, . . .]. But Player 2’s strategy ensures that this structure is also
a model of Q, so it must also be a model of P, and hence must contain a
solution to X0. This solution is in M [X0, . . . , Xn−1] for some n, which gives
Player 2 a winning nth move.
If Γ 0 Q → P then let (M,S) be a model of Γ + Q + ¬P and let X0
be an M-instance of P in S with no solution in S. Since (M,S) is a model
of Γ, it is closed under ∆01-definability, so as long as Player 1’s moves stay
inside S, so must Player 2’s moves. Furthermore, the fact that (M,S) is a
model of Q implies that, as long as Player 2’s moves stay inside S, Player 1
will always be able to reply with moves that stay inside S. So Player 1 can
simply begin by playing (M,S) and X0, and then keep playing elements of
S, which ensures that the game never ends (unless Player 2 cannot make its
first move, in which case it loses immediately).
Remark 2.5. We can extend the above framework beyond extensions of
∆01-comprehension by Π
1
1 formulas. Let us consider ACA0, for instance. If
we redefineM [X0, . . . , Xn−1] by replacing ∆
0
1-definability by arithmetic defin-
ability, then use this new definition in the definitions of the Γ-reduction game
and the modified Γ-reduction game, then Proposition 2.4 carries through es-
sentially unchanged.
There is nothing particularly special about this Γ = ACA0 case. All we
need is the existence of a smallest model M [X0, . . . , Xn−1] of Γ with first-
order part M containing X0, . . . , Xn−1 ⊆ |M | (if there is any such model at
all), and the requirement that then
⋃
nM [X0, . . . , Xn−1] is also a model of
Γ (which will happen if Γ is Π12-axiomatizable). For systems Γ that do not
have such minimal models, such as WKL0, we can still extend these ideas by
redefining our games in a way that does not affect our results when applied
to systems that do have minimal models. For example, ĜΓ(Q→ P) can now
be played according to the following rules.
(1) If at any point a player cannot make a move, the opponent wins.
(2) If one of the players wins, the game ends.
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(3) On the first move, Player 1 plays a model (M,S) of Γ withM countable,
anM-instance X0 of P in S, and a submodel (M,S0) of (M,S) containing
X0. Then Player 2 either plays a solution to X0 in (M,S0) and wins, or
plays an M-instance Y1 of Q in (M,S0).
(4) For n > 1, on the nth move, Player 1 plays a solution Xn−1 to the
instance Yn−1 of Q in S and a submodel (M,Sn−1) of (M,S) containing
Xn−1. Then Player 2 either plays a solution to X0 in (M,Sn−1) and wins,
or plays an M-instance Yn of Q in (M,Sn−1).
(5) If the game never ends then Player 1 wins.
Theorem 3.1 below remains true for ACA0, for instance, since in The-
orem 3.4 we can replace the eth Turing functional by the eth arithmetical
functional. It is not clear how generally Theorem 3.1 holds for other systems,
but we will not pursue this further generalization of our framework here.
3 Reduction games and compactness
As mentioned in the introduction, we can improve on Proposition 2.4 by
showing that a certain kind of compactness theorem holds, with the very
mild extra assumption that Γ proves the existence of a universal Σ01 formula,
i.e., that there is a Σ01 formula θ(e, n,X) such that for every Σ
0
1 formula
ϕ(e, n,X), we have Γ ⊢ ∀e ∃i ∀n ∀X (θ(i, n,X) ↔ ϕ(e, n,X)). In this case,
we assume we have fixed such a θ and a bijective pairing function 〈·, ·〉,
and write Y = ΦXe to mean that for e = 〈i, j〉, we have ∀n [θ(i, n,X) ↔
¬θ(j, n,X)] and ∀n [n ∈ Y ↔ θ(i, n,X)].
The following result, which we will prove in this section, has Theorem 1.6
as a special case.
Theorem 3.1. Let Γ be a consistent extension of ∆01-comprehension by Π
1
1
formulas that proves the existence of a universal Σ01 formula. Let P and Q
be Π12-problems. If Γ ⊢ Q → P then there is an n such that Player 2 has a
winning strategy for ĜΓ(Q→ P) (and hence for ĜΓ+Q(Q→ P)) that ensures
victory in at most n many moves. Otherwise, Player 1 has a winning strategy
for ĜΓ+Q(Q→ P) (and hence for ĜΓ(Q→ P)).
Notice that if the formulas added to ∆01-comprehension to obtain Γ are
true over the standard natural numbers, then a winning strategy for Player
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2 for ĜΓ(Q→ P) that ensures victory in at most n many moves also yields a
winning strategy for Player 2 for G(Q → P) that ensures victory in at most
n many moves, since a run of the latter game is a special case of a run of the
former game in which Player 1 begins by playing the model (ω,P(ω)). Thus
it is not a coincidence that all the examples we have of situations in which
G(Q → P) can be won by Player 2, but not in a number of moves bounded
ahead of time, are ones in which P 6ω Q but RCA0 0 Q → P. In fact, the
following stronger fact holds, where, as defined in [17], P 6nω Q means that
Player 2 has a winning strategy for G(Q → P) that ensures victory in at
most n+ 1 many moves.
Corollary 3.2. Let Γ consist of RCA0 together with all Π
1
1 formulas true
over the natural numbers. If P 
nω Q for all n, then Γ 0 Q→ P.
Notice that the Γ in this corollary includes full arithmetical induction.
An interesting example of the application of this corollary is to take Q to
be RT22 and P to be RT
2
<∞. Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman [8] showed that
RCA0 0 RT
2
k → RT
2
<∞ for all k, but the proof relies on a difference between
the first-order parts of these two principles, and hence does not work if we
add arithmetical induction to RCA0. (Note that, with full induction, RT
2
<∞
does in fact follow from RT22.) Patey [27] showed that RT
2
<∞ 

n
ω RT
2
k for all
n and k, so we have the following.
Corollary 3.3. Let Γ consist of RCA0 together with all Π
1
1 formulas true
over the natural numbers. Then Γ 0 RT2k → RT
2
<∞ for all k.
We learned from Yokoyama [personal communication] that he and Slaman
have recently noticed that this corollary can also be obtained by a more direct
model-theoretic argument, still using Patey’s result.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 will use the following result, which is of inde-
pendent interest as a generalization of Theorem 1.7.
Theorem 3.4. Let Γ be a consistent extension of ∆01-comprehension by Π
1
1
formulas that proves the existence of a universal Σ01 formula. Let P and Q
be Π12-problems. For n ∈ ω, let Θn(e0, . . . , en, X0, . . . , Xn, Y0, . . . , Yn) be a
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formula asserting that
if X0 is a P-instance then (Y0 = Φ
X0
e0
∧ (either Y0 is a solution to X0 or
(Y0 is a Q-instance and if X1 is a solution to Y0 then (Y1 = Φ
X0⊕X1
e1
∧
(either Y1 is a solution to X0 or
(Y1 is a Q-instance and if X2 is a solution to Y1 then (Y2 = Φ
X0⊕X1⊕X2
e2
∧
(either Y2 is a solution to X0 or . . .
...
. . . (Yn = Φ
X0⊕···⊕Xn
en
∧ Yn is a solution to X0)) · · · ),
and let ∆n be
∀X0 ∃e0, Y0 ∀X1 ∃e1, Y1 · · · ∀Xn ∃en, YnΘn(e0, . . . , en, X0, . . . , Xn, Y0, . . . , Yn).
If Γ ⊢ Q→ P, then there exists an n ∈ ω such that Γ ⊢ ∆n.
Proof. Suppose that Γ ⊢ Q→ P but Γ ⊢ ¬∆n for all n. Extend L2 to include
a function symbol f from first-order objects to second-order objects. Call
this new language L′2. Let 〈·, . . . , ·〉 be a fixed numbering scheme for finite
tuples of numbers.
For each n, there is a model M = (M,S) of Γ + ¬∆n. We can turn
M into an L′2-structure by defining the interpretation f
M by recursion as
follows.
There is an X0 ∈ S such that
M  ∀e0, Y0 ∃X1 ∀e1, Y1 · · · ∃Xn ∀en, Yn ¬Θn(e0, . . . , en,
X0, . . . , Xn, Y0, . . . , Yn).
Let fM(〈〉) = X0.
Assume we have defined fM(〈e0, . . . , ej−1〉), where j < n, and have also
defined Y〈e0〉, Y〈e0,e1〉, . . . , Y〈e0,...,ej−1〉 ∈ S so that
M  ∀ej , Yj ∃Xj+1 ∀ej+1, Yj+1∃Xj+2 · · · ∃Xn ∀en, Yn ¬Θn(e0, . . . , en,
fM(〈〉), fM(〈e0〉), . . . , f
M(〈e0, . . . , ej−1〉), Xj+1 . . . , Xn,
Y〈e0〉, Y〈e0,e1〉, . . . , Y〈e0,...,ej−1〉, Yj, . . . , Yn).
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Given ej ∈ M , let Y〈e0,...,ej〉 = Φ
(fM(〈〉)⊕fM(〈e0〉)⊕···⊕fM(〈e0,...,ej−1〉))
ej ∈ S. Then
there is an Xj+1 ∈ S such that
M  ∀ej+1, Yj+1 ∃Xj+2 ∀ej+2, Yj+2∃Xj+3 · · · ∃Xn ∀en, Yn ¬Θn(e0, . . . , en,
fM(〈〉), fM(〈e0〉), . . . , f
M(〈e0, . . . , ej−1〉), Xj+1 . . . , Xn,
Y〈e0〉, Y〈e0,e1〉, . . . , Y〈e0,...,ej〉, Yj+1, . . . , Yn).
Let fM(〈e0, . . . , ej〉) = Xj+1.
Having defined fM on all 〈e0, . . . , ei〉 for i 6 n, let fM(x) = ∅ for all
other x ∈M .
Let
Ψk ≡ ∀e0, Y0 · · · ∀ek, Yk ¬Θk(e0, . . . , ek,
f(〈〉), f(〈e0〉), . . . , f(〈e0, . . . , ek〉), Y0, . . . , Yk).
Then (M; fM)  Ψn by the definition of fM. It is easy to see that this fact
implies that (M; fM)  Ψk for all k 6 n.
Thus every set Γ ∪ {Ψ0, . . . ,Ψn} is satisfiable, and hence so is the union
Γ ∪ {Ψ0,Ψ1, . . .}. Let N = (N, T ) be a model of this set. Now we have a
winning strategy for Player 1 for GΓ(Q→ P): Player 1 begins by playing N
and fN (〈〉), and if e0, . . . , en−1 are indices for Player 2’s first n moves, then
Player 1 plays fN (〈e0, . . . , en−1〉) on its next move. By the definition of Ψn,
Player 2 can never play a solution to fN (〈〉).
But by Proposition 2.4 and our assumption that Γ ⊢ Q → P, Player 2
must have a winning strategy for GΓ(Q→ P), so we have a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We use the notation of Theorem 3.4. By Proposi-
tion 2.4, it is enough to show that if Γ ⊢ Q → P then there is an n such
that Player 2 has a winning strategy for ĜΓ(Q → P) that ensures victory
in at most n many moves. So suppose that Γ ⊢ Q → P. Let n be as in
Theorem 3.4.
Player 2 can play as follows. Let M = (M,S) be the model of Γ played
by Player 1 on its first move. Since M is a model of Γ, it is also a model of
∆n. Let X0 be Player 1’s first move. Since X0 is in S, there are e0 ∈M and
Y0 ∈ S such that M satisfies
∀X1 ∃e1, Y1 ∀X2 ∃e2, Y2 · · · ∀Xn ∃en, YnΘn(e0, . . . , en, X0, . . . , Xn, Y0, . . . , Yn).
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Now Player 2 plays Y0. Let X1 be Player 1’s next move. Then there are
e1 ∈M and Y1 ∈ S such that M satisfies
∀X2 ∃e2, Y2 ∀X3 ∃e3, Y3 · · · ∀Xn ∃en, YnΘn(e0, . . . , en, X0, . . . , Xn, Y0, . . . , Yn).
Now Player 2 plays Y1.
Continuing in this way, by the definition of ∆n, some Yi with i 6 n must
be a solution to X0, and thus this strategy ensures victory by Player 2 in at
most n+ 1 many moves.
We do not know whether Theorem 3.1 holds for GΓ(Q → P) in general,
but normally, if Γ ⊢ Q → P then the proof allows us to obtain a winning
strategy for Player 2 in ĜΓ(Q → P) (and even in GΓ(Q → P)) that is rela-
tively easy to describe. (The special case of computable winning strategies
will be discussed in Section 4.) In such cases, we can show that there is an n
such that this particular winning strategy allows Player 2 to win in at most
n many moves, not just in ĜΓ(Q → P) but in fact in GΓ(Q → P). Here we
are thinking of strategies that are first-order definable, but we need to take
into account the possibility that there might not be a unique choice of move
at a given point (keeping in mind that the idea of choosing the least among
the indices of equally good moves is not always available when working over
nonstandard models).
Definition 3.5. Let Γ be a consistent set of L2-formulas and let Λ(X, n, e)
be an arithmetic formula. Say that Player 2 plays a run of GΓ(Q → P) or
ĜΓ(Q → P) according to Λ if given Player 1’s first n moves, M (or (M,S))
and X0, . . . , Xn−1 ⊆ M , Player 2 plays Φ
X0⊕···⊕Xn−1
e for some e ∈ M such
that M [X0, . . . , Xn−1]  Λ(X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xn−1, n− 1, e).
Theorem 3.6. Let Γ be a consistent extension of ∆01-comprehension that
proves the existence of a universal Σ01 formula. Let P and Q be Π
1
2-problems
and Λ be an arithmetic formula such that Player 2 wins any run of ĜΓ(Q→
P) that it plays according to Λ. Then there is an n such that Player 2 wins
any run of GΓ(Q→ P) that it plays according to Λ in at most n many moves.
Proof. Let Θn be as in Theorem 3.4. Let Ξn be a formula asserting that, for
all i 6 n, if X0 is a P-instance and no Yj with j < i is a solution to X0, then
Λ(X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xi, i, ei). Let Θ̂n be Ξn → Θn, and let Ωn be
∀X0 ∀e0 ∃Y0 ∀X1 ∀e1 ∃Y1 · · · ∀Xn ∀en ∃Yn
Θ̂n(e0, . . . , en, X0, . . . , Xn, Y0, . . . , Yn).
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Suppose there is a run of GΓ(Q → P) such that Player 2 plays according to
Λ but does not win within n moves. Let M and X0, . . . , Xn−1 be Player 1’s
first n moves in that run. ThenM [X0, . . . , Xn−1] can be extended to a model
(M,S) of Γ, and in that model, Ωn−1 does not hold. Thus, to establish the
theorem, it is enough to show that Γ ⊢ Ωn for some n.
Assume for a contradiction that Γ 0 Ωn for all n. Expand L2 by adding
first-order constant symbols c0, c1, . . . and second-order constant symbols
C0, C1, . . . . Then a compactness argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.4
shows that there is a model M of Γ and interpretations cM0 , c
M
1 , . . . and
CM0 , C
M
1 , . . . such that each Φ
CM
0
⊕···⊕CMn
cMn
is total inM, andM together with
these interpretations satisfies
¬Θ̂n(c0, . . . , cn, C0, . . . , Cn,Φ
C0
c0
, . . . ,ΦC0⊕...⊕Cncn )
for all n. But then there is a run of ĜΓ(Q → P) in which Player 2 plays
according to Λ but does not win, namely the one in which Player 1 begins
by playing M, then at each move plays CMn , and Player 2 responds with
Φ
CM
0
⊕···⊕CMn
cMn
, which contradicts our hypothesis.
For Γ is as in Theorem 3.1, write Γ ⊢n Q → P to mean that Player
2 has a winning strategy for ĜΓ(Q → P) that ensures victory in at most
n + 1 many moves. Then the first part of the theorem can be restated as
Γ ⊢ Q → P ⇒ ∃n [Γ ⊢n Q → P]. The idea behind this notation is that we
can see the least n such that Γ ⊢n Q → P as a measure of the number of
applications of Q needed to prove P over Γ. The n = 0 case is equivalent to
Γ ⊢ P. We will discuss the n = 1 case in Section 5, but make the following
remark for now.
Remark 3.7. Recall that P 6nω Qmeans that Player 2 has a winning strategy
for G(Q→ P) that ensures victory in at most n+1 many moves. Hirschfeldt
and Jockusch [17] stated that P 61ω Q is equivalent to P 6c Q, but that
is not quite correct, because if P is computably true (i.e., if P 60ω Q) but
has an instance that does not compute any instance of Q, then P 61ω Q but
P 
c Q. (The same point was made in the context of Weihrauch reducibility
by Brattka, Gherardi, and Pauly [5, Section 3].) As this fairly uninteresting
case is the only in which the two notions differ, however, we can generally
ignore the distinction. We mention it, and make the following remarks, only
because an analogous situation will be relevant below.
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We can define P 6=nω Q to mean that Player 2 has a winning strategy for
G(Q→ P) that ensures victory in exactly n+1 many moves. Then P 6c Q is
equivalent to P 6=1ω Q. This definition is not otherwise very useful, though,
because if Player 2 can win G(Q → P) in m > 2 many moves, then it can
also win that game in k many moves for any k > m, simply by repeating
its first move until it is ready to win, except in the case in which Player 2’s
first move is an instance of Q with no solution (and in this context we are
generally not interested in problems that are false over ω as statements of
second-order arithmetic).
Note also that P 6nω Q is not quite equivalent to ∃m 6 n [P 6
=m
ω Q],
again because of 1-move runs. For example, let P be the Π12-problem whose
instances are ∅ and ∅′, with unique solutions ∅ and ∅′′, respectively; and let
Q be the Π12-problem whose only instance is ∅
′, with unique solution ∅′′. If
Player 1 begins by playing ∅′, then Player 2 cannot win immediately, but can
play ∅′, to which Player 1 must reply with ∅′′, at which point Player 2 wins
by playing ∅′′. So in this case, Player 2 wins in 2 moves. However, if Player
1 plays ∅, then Player 2 has only one legal move, namely the winning move
∅. Thus P 61ω Q, but the first case shows that P 

=0
ω Q, while the second
case shows that P 
=1ω Q.
Similar considerations hold for the notion of P 6ngW Q introduced in [17],
and for Γ ⊢n Q → P. One way around these issues is to replace Q with
the problem Q̂ where an instance is either {0} ∪ {n + 1 : n ∈ X} for an
instance X of Q, with a solution to this instance being any solution to X ;
or ∅, with the only solution being ∅ (although if we allow problems Q that
have instances with no solutions, we might still have P 6ngW Q̂ but not have
∃m 6 n [P 6=mgW Q̂], because a computable winning strategy might not be
able to tell when it is about to play an instance of Q with no solution, and
thus instantly win).
The definition of Γ ⊢n Q→ P was made in [17] (for Γ = RCA0), but with
GΓ(Q → P) in place of ĜΓ(Q → P). We have chosen our definition in light
of Theorem 3.1, but at least in natural cases, there should be no difference,
as shown by the following fact.
Proposition 3.8. Let Γ be a consistent extension of ∆01-comprehension that
proves the existence of a universal Σ01 formula. Let P and Q be Π
1
2-problems
and Λ be an arithmetic formula such that Player 2 wins any run of ĜΓ(Q→
P) that it plays according to Λ in at most n many moves. Then Player 2
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wins any run of GΓ(Q → P) that it plays according to Λ in at most n many
moves.
Proof. In the notation of the proof of Theorem 3.6, it is easy to see that
Γ ⊢ Ωn−1, and hence Player 2 has a winning strategy for GΓ(Q → P) that
ensures victory in at most n many moves as in that proof.
Remark 3.9. Hirst and Mummert [20] discussed a different potential form
of instance-counting, based on a notion of proving a Π12 principle P with one
typical use of another Π12 principle Q in a system Γ. While the definition of
that notion in their paper is not quite correct [Hirst and Mummert, personal
communication], its main significance is that it allowed them to conclude
that, in cases of interest, Γ then proves that for every instance X of P,
there is an instance Y of Q such that if Y has a solution then so does X .
While their paper is mostly concerned with intuitionistic logic, they also
gave examples showing that this notion does not seem useful in the context
of classical logic. In particular they showed how RT24 can be obtained with
one typical use of RT22 over RCA0, contrary both to our intuition and to
the fact that RCA0 01 RT
2
2 → RT
2
4, which follows from Patey’s result [28]
that RT24 
c RT
2
2. In fact, as conjectured by J. Miller [Hirst and Mummert,
personal communication], this phenomenon is not a particularity of this and
other examples mentioned in [20], but is in fact completely general. Indeed,
in classical logic, if Γ ⊢ Q→ P then we can always argue in Γ as follows: Let
X be an instance of P. Then there are i and Y such that either i = 0 and
Y is a solution to X , or i = 1 and Y is an instance of Q with no solution. If
i = 1 then we get a contradiction from one use of Q, so i = 0 and hence Y is
a solution to X .
Perhaps more satisfying than the above argument is the following one,
which is directly in the style of the one given in [20] for RT22 and RT
2
4. Let Γ
be as in Theorem 3.1, and let P and Q be Π12-problems such that Γ ⊢ Q→ P.
Let Θn and ∆n be as in Theorem 3.4. By that theorem, there is an n such
that Γ ⊢ ∆n. The following proof can be carried out in Γ.
Let X0 be an instance of P. For each k = 0, . . . , n in turn, proceed as
follows. Given X0, . . . , Xk, e0, . . . , ek−1, and Y0, . . . , Yk−1, let ek and Yk be
such that
∀Xk+1 ∃ek+1, Yk+1 · · · ∀Xn ∃en, YnΘn(e0, . . . , en, X0, . . . , Xn, Y0, . . . , Yn).
If Yk is a solution to X0 then let Y = Yk and let i = 0. Otherwise, Yk is an
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instance of Q. Either that instance has a solution or not. If it does not then
let Y = Yk and let i = 1. If it does, then let Xk+1 be such a solution.
By the definition of Θn, we must eventually define Y , i, and j. If i = 1
then Y is an instance of Q with no solution. But with one application of
Q, we can obtain a solution to Y , so we must have i = 0, and hence Y is a
solution to X0.
4 Computable winning strategies
We now turn to the notion of generalized Weihrauch reducibility for games
over possibly nonstandard models. Let Γ be a consistent set of L2-formulas
that proves the existence of a universal Σ01 formula. Let P and Q be Π
1
2-
problems. A computable strategy for Player 2 in GΓ(Q → P) or ĜΓ(Q → P)
consists of Player 2 playing according to the formula e = Φk(n − 1) (in the
sense of Definition 3.5) for some k ∈ ω.
Remark 4.1. To be precise, in the above definition we also need to have a
mechanism to distinguish computably when Player 2 has played a winning
move. Formally, we can simply slightly alter our games so that a move by
Player 2 is either {n + 1 : n ∈ Y } where Y is a Q-instance or {0} ∪ {n + 1 :
n ∈ Y } where Y is a solution to Player 1’s first move X0.
Combining Theorem 3.6 and Proposition 3.8 gives us the following.
Proposition 4.2. Let Γ be a consistent extension of ∆01-comprehension that
proves the existence of a universal Σ01 formula, and let P and Q be Π
1
2-
problems. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) Player 2 has a computable winning strategy for GΓ(Q→ P).
(2) Player 2 has a computable winning strategy for ĜΓ(Q→ P).
(3) There is an n ∈ ω such that Player 2 has a computable strategy for
GΓ(Q→ P) that ensures victory in at most n many moves.
(4) There is an n ∈ ω such that Player 2 has a computable strategy for
ĜΓ(Q→ P) that ensures victory in at most n many moves.
Furthermore, n witnesses (3) iff it witnesses (4).
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If the conditions in this proposition hold, then we say that P is generalized
Weihrauch reducible over Γ to Q, and write P 6ΓgW Q. We can of course
define an instance-counting version of this notion, writing P 6Γ, ngW Q if n + 1
witnesses that item (3) above holds.
As an example of the application of Proposition 4.2, we can obtain an
analog of Corollary 3.3, using the fact that Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17,
Theorem 4.21] showed that RT1<∞ 

n
gW RT
1
k for all n, while Patey [27, The-
orem 6.0.1] showed that the same holds for higher exponents. (Notice that
Corollary 3.3 itself works only for exponent 2, since RT1<∞ is provable in
RCA0 + BΣ
0
2, while RT
n
k for k > 1 and RT
n
<∞ are both equivalent to ACA0
over RCA0 for n > 2, as shown by Simpson [30] using work of Jockusch [21].)
Corollary 4.3. Let Γ consist of RCA0 together with all Π
1
1 formulas true
over the natural numbers. Then RTn<∞ 

Γ
gW RT
n
k for all n and k.
Kuyper [23] studied a notion closely related to this kind of instance-
counting (though he considered only the case where Γ is RCA0). We give a
slightly different definition that is easily seen to be equivalent to his.
Definition 4.4. Let P and Q be Π12-problems. Say that PWeihrauch-reduces
to the composition of n many copies of Q via e0, . . . , en if for everyX0, . . . , Xn,
if X0 is a P-instance then
ΦX0e0 is a Q-instance and if X1 is a solution to Φ
X0
e0
then
ΦX0⊕X1e1 is a Q-instance and if X2 is a solution to Φ
X0⊕X1
e1
then
...
ΦX0⊕···⊕Xn−1en−1 is a Q-instance and if Xn is a solution to Φ
X0⊕···⊕Xn−1
en−1
then
ΦX0⊕···⊕Xnen is a solution to X0.
(Note that in the n = 0 case, this statement becomes
if X0 is a P-instance then Φ
X0
e0
is a solution to X0.)
Kuyper considered the situation where there are n ∈ ω and e0, . . . , en ∈ ω
such that RCA0 proves that P Weihrauch-reduces to the composition of n
many copies of Q via e0, . . . , en. For a fixed n, it is not difficult to see
that this condition is equivalent to saying that Player 2 has a a computable
winning strategy for GΓ(Q→ P) that ensures victory in exactly n+ 1 many
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moves, unless it wins earlier by playing an instance of Q with no solution.
One might think that this is the same as saying that there is an n such that
P 6
RCA0, n
gW Q, and hence by Proposition 4.2 to P 6
RCA0
gW Q, but Remark 3.7
applies here as well. The example given there shows that it is possible to
have P 6RCA0, 1gW Q but not have Kuyper’s condition hold. However, Kuyper’s
condition is equivalent to P 6RCA0gW Q̂ for the modified problem Q̂ defined in
that remark, so we we will express it in this form.
Kuyper [23] claimed that his condition is equivalent to a form of intu-
itionistically provable implication. Uftring [33, 34] found a counterexample
that shows that Kuyper’s argument is flawed. Kuyper (see [33, 34]) proposed
fixing his proof by replacing the condition P 6RCA0gW Q̂ with P 6
RCA0 +Q
gW Q̂.
Uftring’s example shows that it is possible for Player 2 to have a computable
winning strategy for GRCA0+Q(Q→ P) but not for GRCA0(Q→ P), in contrast
with the case for general winning strategies in Proposition 2.4, so we present
a version of it now. We will give another example with the same properties
in Section 6.
Example 4.5 (Uftring [33, 34]). The proof of Go¨del’s Incompleteness The-
orem shows that there is a primitive recursive predicate G such that G(n)
holds for all n ∈ ω but RCA0 cannot prove ∀xG(x). For X 6= ∅, write µX
for the least element of X . Let
P ≡ ∀X ∃Y ∀xG(x)
and
Q ≡ ∀X [X 6= ∅ → ∃Y G(µX)].
In GRCA0+Q(Q → P), Player 1’s first move M and X0 must be such that
M [X0] is consistent with Q, so M [X0]  ∀xG(x), and hence Player 2 can
play, say, ∅ on its first move and win. In GRCA0(Q → P), however, Player 1
can play an M  ¬∀xG(x), together with, say, X0 = ∅. Then this instance
of P has no solution, so the only way for Player 2 to win is eventually to play
an M-instance of Q with no solution, that is, an X such that M  ¬G(µX).
For any modelM of Σ01-PA, we can consider a run in which Player 1 plays
M and then keeps playing ∅ until Player 2 either declares victory or wins by
playing anM-instance of Q with no solution. (Notice that we can computably
determine if the latter case holds, since the condition G(µX) is computable.)
If Player 2 has a computable winning strategy for GRCA0(Q→ P), then there
is a computable procedure that, over any model M of Σ01-PA, simulates the
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above run, making Player 2’s moves according to this procedure, outputting
0 if Player 2 declares victory, and outputting µX if Player 2 plays the M-
instance X of Q with no solution. The output of this procedure is 0 iff
M  ∀xG(x). Since this procedure works for any modelM of Σ01-PA, we have
an existential first-order sentence that is provably equivalent to ∀xG(x) over
RCA0, which is a contradiction, because any existential first-order sentence
true in the standard natural numbers is provable in RCA0.
For some Π12-problems Q, on the other hand, there is no difference between
GRCA0+Q(Q → P) and GRCA0(Q → P) because every countable model of
RCA0 can be extended to a countable model of RCA0 + Q with the same
first-order part, and hence the notion of consistency used in Definition 2.1
is the same for RCA0 and RCA0 + Q. (Showing that this is the case for
a given Q is typically done to show that Q is Π11-conservative over RCA0.)
Examples include WKL, as shown by Harrington (see [31, Theorem IX.2.1]),
COH, as shown by Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman [8], and AMT, as shown
by Hirschfeldt, Shore, and Slaman [18].
As highlighted by the work of Kuyper and Uftring, the connections with
intuitionistic provability are rather subtle, and we believe that generalized
Weihrauch reducibility over possibly nonstandard models can be useful in
clarifying them. However, as the methods and issues are rather different
from the ones in this paper, we leave this work to a future one.
5 Single-instance reductions
As noted in Remark 3.7, P 6c Q iff Player 2 has a strategy for G(Q → P)
that ensures victory in exactly two moves. Similarly, P 6gW Q iff Player 2
has a computable strategy for G(Q→ P) that ensures victory in exactly two
moves. We can define the analogous notions for games over possibly non-
standard models. Here we give direct definitions, which can also be adapted
to define the analogs of other related notions of computability-theoretic re-
duction between Π12-problems.
Definition 5.1. Let Γ be a set of L2-formulas that proves the existence of a
universal Σ01 formula and let P and Q be Π
1
2-problems.
1. We say that P is computably reducible over Γ to Q, and write P 6Γc Q,
if for every model (M,S) of Γ and every M-instance X of P in S, there
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is an M-instance X̂ of Q in M [X ] such that for every solution Ŷ to X̂
in S, there is a solution to X in M [X, Ŷ ].
2. We say that P is Weihrauch reducible over Γ to Q, and write P 6ΓW Q,
if there are e, i ∈ ω such that for every model (M,S) of Γ and every
M-instance X of P in S, the set X̂ = ΦXe is an M-instance of Q, and
for every solution Ŷ to X̂ in S, the set ΦX⊕Ŷi is a solution to X .
3. We say that P is strongly computably reducible over Γ to Q, and write
P 6Γsc Q, if for every model (M,S) of Γ and every M-instance X of P in
S, there is an M-instance X̂ of Q in M [X ] such that for every solution
Ŷ to X̂ in S, there is a solution to X in M [Ŷ ].
4. We say that P is strongly Weihrauch reducible over Γ to Q, and write
P 6ΓsW Q, if there are e, i ∈ ω such that for every model (M,S) of Γ
and every M-instance X of P in S, the set X̂ = ΦXe is an M-instance
of Q, and for every solution Ŷ to X̂ in S, the set ΦŶi is a solution to X .
5. We say that P is omnisciently computably reducible over Γ to Q, and
write P 6Γoc Q, if for every model (M,S) of Γ and every M-instance
X of P in S, there is an M-instance X̂ of Q in S such that for every
solution Ŷ to X̂ in S, there is a solution to X in M [X, Ŷ ].
6. We say that P is omnisciently Weihrauch reducible over Γ to Q, and
write P 6ΓoW Q, if there is an i ∈ ω such that for every model (M,S) of
Γ and every M-instance X of P in S, there is an M-instance X̂ of Q in
S such that for every solution Ŷ to X̂ in S, the set ΦX⊕Ŷi is a solution
to X .
7. We say that P is strongly omnisciently computably reducible over Γ to
Q, and write P 6Γsoc Q, if for every model (M,S) of Γ and every M-
instance X of P in S, there is an M-instance X̂ of Q in S such that for
every solution Ŷ to X̂ in S, there is a solution to X in M [Ŷ ].
8. We say that P is strongly omnisciently Weihrauch reducible over Γ to
Q, and write P 6ΓsoW Q, if there is an i ∈ ω such that for every model
(M,S) of Γ and every M-instance X of P in S, there is an M-instance
X̂ of Q in S such that for every solution Ŷ to X̂ in S, the set ΦŶi is a
solution to X .
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Remark 5.2. In light of comments made above, it might be more natural to
consider versions corresponding to games in which Player 2 can always win
in one or two moves, rather than exactly two moves (even if in natural cases,
there will be no difference). Rather than introduce more terminology and
notation, however, that can be done simply by replacing Q with the problem
Q̂ from Remark 3.7 in the above definitions.
The study of Weihrauch reducibility in this extended setting seems par-
ticularly promising, given the extensive theory that has been developed for
Weihrauch reducibility over the standard natural numbers. In particular,
there are several operators on the Weihrauch degrees whose analogs in this
setting should be of interest. One example is the finite parallelization: For
a problem P, the problem P∗ is the one whose instances consist of finitely
many instances X0, . . . , Xk of P, with a solution consisting of one solution
to each Xi. Clearly, P
∗ 6gW P for any Π
1
2-problem P, but this fact does not
hold in our setting, because given an instance X0, . . . , Xk of P
∗, the obvious
reduction strategy for Player 2 takes k + 1 many moves, and k might be
nonstandard. The following example will be relevant in the next section.
Example 5.3. Pauly, Fouche´, and Davie [29] defined Bound as follows: An
instance is an enumeration of a bounded set F , and a solution is a bound on
the elements of F . An instance of Bound∗ is then a simultaneous enumeration
of a finite family F0, . . . , Fk of bounded sets, and a solution to this instance
consists of a bound for each Fi, or, equivalently, a bound b on
⋃
i6k Fk. (This
is basically the principle FUF studied by Frittaion and Marcone [14].) It is
easy to see that Bound and Bound∗ are Weihrauch-equivalent, but that is no
longer the case for Weihrauch-equivalence (or even provable equivalence) over
RCA0, since as statements in second-order arithmetic, Bound is trivially true,
while Bound∗ is a way to state BΠ01, and hence is equivalent to BΣ
0
2 over RCA0,
as we further discuss in the following section. Thus RCA0 0 Bound→ Bound
∗,
and hence Bound∗ 
RCA0gW Bound.
It follows that the natural way to generalize the ⋄ operator of Neumann
and Pauly [26] to this setting is no longer equivalent to gW-reducibility, since
P∗ is always gW-reducible to P⋄.
On the other hand, it is clear that, as for standard Weihrauch reducibility,
if P 6RCA0W Q then P
∗ 6RCA0W Q
∗. It is also not difficult to see that, more
generally, if P 6RCA0, ngW Q then P
∗ 6
RCA0, n
gW Q
∗. Thus, by Proposition 4.2, if
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P 6RCA0gW Q then P
∗ 6RCA0gW Q
∗. (The same holds for other appropriate systems
in place of RCA0, of course.)
An important point here is that while the principles we consider in reverse
mathematics are typically true—in the sense that they hold in (ω,P(ω)), or
equivalently for Π12-problems, that every instance (over the standard natural
numbers) has at least one solution—many of them have nontrivial first-order
parts. For example, if BΣ02 fails in M , then M cannot be the first-order part
of a model of RCA0+RT
1
<∞ (or of RCA0+RT
n
k for any n, k > 2). Furthermore,
for any such M there is an instance of RT1<∞ (i.e., a k ∈ |M | together with a
function c : |M | → {j ∈ |M | : j <M k}) with no solutions. The same is true
of Bound∗, to give another example.
We want to use notions such as Weihrauch reducibility over RCA0 and
other systems to study these kinds of principles (as we will do in the next
two sections), so it is important that our definitions above do not assume
that every instance of a problem has a solution. This fact is particularly
worth noting for Weihrauch reducibility, because we usually think of (clas-
sical) Weihrauch reducibility between Π12-problems as a special case of the
general notion from computable analysis, which is defined using partial mul-
tifunctions between represented spaces. (See for instance Brattka, Gherardi,
and Pauly [5] or Brattka and Pauly [6].) This point is a bit subtle, and
was missed, e.g., in the paper Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst, Mileti, and Shafer
[11], where a proof is given in Corollaries A.3 and A.4 establishing a cor-
respondence between Π12 principles on the one hand and certain classes of
partial multifunctions on the other. Indeed, the proof there works only if
the Π12 principles in question are assumed to be true, which is not explicitly
mentioned.
There is more than one way to formalize the notion of a partial multi-
function between spaces X and Y . One is to say that it is simply a relation
R ⊆ X×Y . Then the domain of the multifunction is {x ∈ X : ∃y (x, y) ∈ R}.
Another is to say that it is a (possibly partial) function from X to the power
set of Y . In this case, the domain of the multifunction can include elements
that are mapped to no values at all. The first formalization is the one nor-
mally used in the definition of Weihrauch reducibility in computable analysis,
which is convenient in particular because of the need to use choice functions
in working with represented spaces. And indeed, a true Π12-problem P cor-
responds to the partial multifunction F : ⊆2ω ⇒ 2ω in this sense whose
domain is the set of instances of P, and which maps any such instance X to
the solutions to X .
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This correspondence breaks down for a Π12-problem that has instances
with no solutions, however, unless we move to the second formalization of
the notion of multifunction, or allow a multifunction to consist of a relation
R ⊆ X × Y together with a set D such that {x ∈ X : ∃y (x, y) ∈ R} ⊆
D ⊆ X , where D represents the domain of the function. This distinction
operates even at the level of the Weihrauch degrees (equivalence classes under
Weihrauch reducibility), because a problem in which some instance has no
solutions can never be Weihrauch reducible to one in which every instance
has a solution, and if P has a computable instance with no solutions, then
every problem is Weihrauch reducible to P. As discussed in [5], and in more
detail in [6], this top degree is usually added to the lattice of Weihrauch
degrees as a formal object.
The distinction between the two approaches is also noted by Bauer and
Yoshimura [2] (see also [3]), who distinguish between (ordinary) Weihrauch
reducibility and what they term extended Weihrauch reducibility. The fo-
cus in their work is on comparing universal statements in the setting of
constructive mathematics, for which they introduce a notion called instance
reducibility. When this notion is interpreted in the context of represented
spaces one obtains precisely a version of Weihrauch reducibility that allows
for “questions that do not have an answer” but that are still “valid” for the
purposes of whether or not they are reducible to other questions (Bauer [1]).
6 Limit-homogeneous sets
In this section and the next, we give some examples of comparisons of Π12-
problems using W- and gW-reducibility over possibly nonstandard models,
focusing on versions of BΣ02. A natural way to think of BΠ
0
1 as a Π
1
2-problem
is to identify a Π01 formula ϕ(i, k) with a simultaneous enumeration of the
sets {m : ∀k < m¬ϕ(i, k)} for i < n. Then a b as in the definition of BΠ01
is the same as a common bound for these sets. Thus we arrive at Bound∗, as
defined in Example 5.3.
Recall also the Π12-problems SRT
2
2 and D
2
2 from Definition 1.1. Clearly,
SRT
2
2 implies D
2
2. Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman [8] claimed that the converse
implication also holds over RCA0, but their proof actually required BΣ
0
2.
Chong, Lempp, and Yang [9] closed this gap by showing that D22 implies BΣ
0
2
over RCA0.
The argument in [8] also shows that SRT22 6c D
2
2. Dzhafarov [13] and
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Brattka and Rakotoniaina [7] showed that SRT22 
W D
2
2. Hirschfeldt and
Jockusch [17] noted that SRT22 6
2
gW D
2
2, however. To consider this reduction
in more detail, we define the following Π12-problem.
Definition 6.1. LH: If c : [N]2 → 2 is such that limy c(x, y) = 1 for all x,
then c has an infinite homogeneous set.
This problem is a convenient way to state the principle that for every 2-
coloring of pairs, every infinite limit-homogeneous set has an infinite homo-
geneous subset.
From the reverse-mathematical perspective, LH is equivalent to BΣ02.
Proposition 6.2. RCA0 ⊢ LH↔ BΣ02.
Proof. First, assume BΣ02. Fix an instance c of LH. Let S be the set of all
tuples (x0, . . . , xn−1, y) such that x0 < · · · < xn−1 < y and c(xm, y) = 1
for all m < n. We claim that for all x0 < · · · < xn−1, there is a y such
that (x0, . . . , xn−1, y) ∈ S. For each m < n there is a bm > xn−1 such that
c(xm, y) = 1 for all y > bm. By BΣ
0
2 (or really BΠ
0
1), there is a b > xn−1
such that c(xm, y) = 1 for all m < n and y > b. Then (x0, . . . , xn−1, b+ 1) ∈
S, which proves our claim. Now we can define a homogeneous set H for
c by primitive recursion: Let h0 = 0, let hn+1 be the least y such that
(h0, . . . , hn, y) ∈ S, and let H = {h0, h1, . . .}.
Now assume LH. We prove RT1<∞. Assume for a contradiction that
d : N→ k has no infinite homogeneous set. Then for each i < k there is a b
such that d(x) 6= i for all x > b. Define c : [N]2 → 2 by letting c(x, y) = 0 if
d(x) = d(y) and letting c(x, y) = 1 otherwise. Then limy c(x, y) = 1 for all x,
so by LH, c has an infinite homogeneous set H . Let x0 < · · · < xk ∈ H . Then
for all m < n 6 k, we have that c(xm, xn) = 1 and hence d(xm) 6= d(xn).
But then {d(x0), . . . , d(xk)} has cardinality k + 1, which is impossible.
However, the first part of the above proof shows that LH is computability-
theoretically trivial, and indeed uniformly computably true, so that LH 60gW
P for any P, or equivalently LH 6W 1, where 1 is the identity problem for
which an instance is any X and the only solution to this instance is X itself.
We can obtain SRT22 from D
2
2 as follows: Given a stable coloring c : N → 2,
use D22 to obtain a limit-homogeneous set L. Now an application of RT
1
2
(which is Weihrauch-reducible to D22) yields an i such that limy∈L c(x, y) = i
for all x ∈ L. We can think of c restricted to L as a coloring of N by
identifying the nth element of L with n. If i = 0, we can also replace c by
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the coloring whose value at (x, y) is 1 − c(x, y). We can then apply LH to
obtain an infinite homogeneous set for c. Since LH is Weihrauch-trivial, this
procedure shows that SRT22 6
2
gW D
2
2. (Since the use of RT
1
2 is computably
trivial, it also shows that SRT22 6c D
2
2, as mentioned above.)
Over nonstandard models, however, things are different. In the presence
of BΣ02, the first part of the proof of Proposition 6.2 shows that LH is still
Weihrauch-trivial, i.e., LH 6
RCA0 + BΣ02
W 1, and hence SRT
2
2 6
RCA0 + BΣ02, 2
gW D
2
2.
Of course, if P does not imply BΣ02 over RCA0, then we cannot have LH 6
RCA0
gW
P. But what if we take P to be some form of BΣ02? A natural choice is
Bound
∗, as it is essentially the form of BΠ01 used in the first part of the proof
of Proposition 6.2.
We will show that LH 
RCA0gW Bound
∗, but we can actually obtain a stronger
result by considering the contrapositive form of BΠ01: Given a simultaneous
enumeration of sets F0, . . . , Fn−1 with no common bound, there is an i < n
such that Fi is infinite. Given such an enumeration, we can define an n-
coloring c of N as follows: for each m, wait until a number greater than
m is enumerated into some Fi, then give m the color i. From an infinite
homogeneous set for c, we can obtain an i < n such that Fi is infinite.
Conversely, given an n-coloring c of N, the sets Fi = {m : c(m) = i} for
i < n have no common bound, and from an i < n such that Fi is infinite,
we can obtain an infinite homogeneous set for c. Both of these processes can
be carried out over RCA0, so up to Weihrauch equivalence over RCA0, the
contrapositive form of BΠ01 is RT
1
<∞, in the form in which it is usually stated
as a Π12-problem, in which an instance consists of a k-coloring of N together
with the number k.
Remark 6.3. The above argument (which we heard from Pauly [personal
communication]) also gives a simple proof of Hirst’s result from [19] (see
also [16, Theorem 6.81]) that BΣ02 and RT
1
<∞ are equivalent over RCA0.
There is a stronger form of RT1<∞, which we will call stRT
1
<∞, in which
the number of colors is not part of the instance. That is, an instance consists
of a function N → N with bounded range (and a solution is still an infinite
homogeneous set). As shown by Brattka and Rakotoniaina [7], and also
noted by Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17], RT1<∞ <W stRT
1
<∞. In this section,
we show that LH 
RCA0gW stRT
1
<∞. We will show in Proposition 7.6 that
Bound
∗ 6RCA0gW stRT
1
<∞, so this result implies that LH 

RCA0
gW Bound
∗, but we
also give a direct proof of the latter fact, which uses the same technique but
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is simpler.
Both proofs will use the following notion of forcing.
Definition 6.4. Let N be an L1-structure. We define a notion of forcing PN
as follows. (If N is the standard natural numbers then we denote this notion
by Pω.) Write [m]
2 for the set of (x, y) ∈ [|N |]2 such that x, y <N m. A
condition is an N -finite function of the form p : [m]2 → 2 for some m ∈ |N |.
Say that a condition q extends such a p if q extends p as a function and
q(i, j) = 1 for all i <N m and j >N m on which it is defined. Define the
notion of c : [|N |]2 → 2 extending p in the same way. (Notice that if for
every m ∈ |N | there is a condition p : [m]2 → 2 such that c extends p, then
c is an N -instance of LH.)
We will also use the following fact. (A 1-elementary extension of a struc-
ture N is an extension of N that satisfies exactly the same existential sen-
tences with parameters from N .)
Lemma 6.5. There is a 1-elementary extension M of the standard natural
numbers such that for the collection S of all subsets of |M | that are ∆01-
definable over M ,
1. (M,S) is a model of RCA0 and
2. for any condition p for the notion of forcing PM , there is an M-instance
of LH in S that extends p (in the sense of Definition 6.4) and has no
solution in S.
Proof. Let N be any nonstandard elementary extension of the standard nat-
ural numbers, and let a ∈ N be a nonstandard element. Then in particular
N  IΣ02, and so
M = {x ∈ N : x is Σ02-definable in (N, a)}
is a model of IΣ01 + ¬BΣ
0
2 which is a 1-elementary (in fact, 2-elementary)
substructure of N . (See Ha´jek and Pudlak [15, Theorem IV.1.33] or Kossak
[22, p. 223].) Thus, M is a 1-elementary extension of the standard model,
and for S as in the statement, (M,S) is a model of RCA0. Since BΣ
0
2 fails
in M , it follows by Proposition 6.2 that LH fails in (M,S). Fix an instance
c : [M ]2 → 2 of LH in S with no solution in S. Then given a condition
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p : [m]2 → 2 for PM , we can define d : [M ]2 → 2 by
d(x, y) =


p(x, y) if x, y < m,
1 if x < m and y > m,
c(x, y) otherwise.
Clearly, d is in S and is an instance of LH that extends p. But if H is any
solution to d then {x ∈ H : x > m} is a solution to c, so d cannot have any
solution in S.
Proposition 6.6. LH 
RCA0gW Bound
∗.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that LH 6RCA0gW Bound
∗. By Proposi-
tion 4.2, there is an n ∈ ω such that Player 2 has a computable strategy
for ĜRCA0(Bound∗ → LH) that ensures victory in at most n many moves. Fix
such a strategy.
For a condition p : [j]2 → 2 for the notion of forcing Pω, we can consider
what happens when our fixed strategy for Player 2 is applied to a run in
which Player 1 plays (ω,P(ω)) and p as a partial first move. Unless the
strategy declares victory on its first move, it must play part of an instance of
Bound
∗, which is just a simultaneous enumeration of a finite family of sets.
We may assume by the usual convention on uses that no number greater
than j is enumerated. Let bp0 be the least bound on the set of all numbers
enumerated in this way. Now, if Player 1 plays bp0, then unless our strategy
declares victory on its second move, it again must play part of an instance of
Bound
∗, yielding an analogous bound bp1. Continuing in this way, we obtain
numbers bp0, b
p
1, . . . , b
p
k for some k < n. Let b
p
i = 0 for k < i < n.
For i < n and m ∈ ω, let Di,m be the set of conditions p such that
bpi > m. If some D0,m is not dense then let m0 be the least such m. In this
case, there is a condition p0 ∈ D0,m0−1 with no extension in D0,m0 . Notice
that bq0 = m0 − 1 for all extensions q of p0. Now, if some D1,m is not dense
below p0 then let m1 be the least such m. In this case, there is an extension of
p0 in D1,m1−1 with no extension in D1,m1 . Proceeding in this way, we obtain
a condition p such that either mi is defined for every i < n, or there is a
k < n such that mi is defined for all i < k and every Dk,m is dense below p.
In either case, bqi = mi − 1 for all extensions q of p and all i such that mi is
defined.
We claim that the latter case cannot hold. Suppose otherwise. Let c
be an instance of LH that extends p and meets every Dk,m (i.e., every Dk,m
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contains a q such that c extends q). Then Player 1 can play (ω,P(ω)) and c
on its first move, and if Player 2 follows our fixed strategy, then the moves
m0, m1, . . . , mk−1 will be legal for Player 1 (as otherwise some finite portion
of c is a condition q extending p with bqi > mi for some i < k). But then
Player 2’s (k + 1)st move is not an instance of Bound∗.
Thus each mi for i < n is defined, and we have the following for our fixed
condition p:
∀q ∀i < n [if q extends p then bqi = mi − 1]. (6.1)
Now let M and S be as in Lemma 6.5. Then p is also a condition for PM ,
so there is an M-instance d of LH in S that extends p and has no solution
in S. But it is easy to check that (6.1) is a Π01 statement, so since M is a 1-
elementary extension of the standard natural numbers, it also holds over M .
So Player 1 can play (M,S) and d on its first move, and if Player 2 follows
our fixed strategy, then the moves m0, m1, . . . , mn−1 will be legal for Player
1 (as otherwise some finite portion of d is a condition q extending p with
bqi >
M mi for some i < n). But then Player 2 has not won the game by the
nth move (since the only way for Player 2 to win this run of the game is to
play anM-instance of Bound∗ with no solution), contrary to assumption.
Thus LH and Bound∗ constitute a natural example of the phenomenon
witnessed by Uftring’s Example 4.5.
We can also interpret the fact that LH 6RCA0 + Bound
∗
W 1 but LH 

RCA0
gW
Bound
∗ as saying that the use of Bound∗ in the first part of the proof of
Proposition 6.2 is “purely proof-theoretic”. It neither requires a further
“computability-theoretic application” of Bound∗ nor can be replaced by one
or more such applications (in the uniform setting). Uncovering this kind of
information seems to be a promising aspect of this approach to calibrating
the logical strength of Π12-problems.
Proposition 6.6 does not show that SRT22 

RCA0
gW D
2
2, but it suggests that
this might well be the case, which would provide an even more natural version
of Example 4.5, and show that the proof of SRT22 from D
2
2 necessarily makes
both computability-theoretic and further proof-theoretic use of D22. Indeed,
it even seems possible that LH 
RCA0gW D
2
2.
Question 6.7. Is SRT22 6
RCA0
gW D
2
2? Is LH 6
RCA0
gW D
2
2?
We now strengthen Proposition 6.6 as described above.
Proposition 6.8. LH 
RCA0gW stRT
1
<∞.
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Proof. Assume for a contradiction that LH 6RCA0gW stRT
1
<∞. By Proposi-
tion 4.2, there is an n ∈ ω such that Player 2 has a computable strategy
for ĜRCA0(stRT1<∞ → LH) ensuring victory in at most n many moves. There
is then also a strategy that ensures victory in exactly n many moves, since
Player 2 can extend the length of any game by playing computable (∆01-
definable) instances of stRT1<∞ on all its moves from some point on. Fix
such a strategy, and for notational convenience, assume n > 1.
We begin as in the previous proof by considering games over the standard
natural numbers. Note that if Player 2 plays according to its strategy and
does not declare victory on some move, then it has to play an instance of
stRT
1
<∞ only provided all of Player 1’s moves so far have been legal. However,
since every set can be viewed as a coloring ω → ω (not necessarily with
bounded range), we can always assume that Player 2 plays such a coloring.
This coloring may be partial, however, in which case by usual use conventions
we can assume it is defined on a finite initial segment of ω.
Fix a condition p for the notion of forcing Pω. For each α ∈ ω6n−2, we
define a coloring f pα of a finite initial segment of ω. Having done so, we let
Hpα⌢v for each v ∈ ω be the set of all x such that f
p
α(x) = v. We start with
α equal to λ, the empty string. As in the proof of Proposition 6.6, suppose
Player 1 plays (ω,P(ω)) and p as a partial first move. Since n > 1, the
strategy for Player 2 makes it play a coloring of a finite initial segment of
ω as its partial first move. Let f pλ be this coloring. Now, suppose f
p
α has
been defined for some α with |α| < n − 2, and fix v ∈ ω. Suppose Player 1
plays (ω,P(ω)) and p as a partial first move, and for 0 < k 6 |α|+ 1, plays
Hp(α⌢v)↾k as a partial (k + 1)st move, with Player 2 playing according to its
fixed strategy. Since n > |α| + 2, the strategy for Player 2 makes it again
play a coloring of an initial segment as its partial (|α|+2)nd move. Let f pα⌢v
be this coloring.
We now define a finitely branching subtree T of ω6n−2, and for each
α ∈ T , a condition pα, such that the following properties hold:
1. For all α, β ∈ T , if β length-lexicographically precedes α then pα ex-
tends pβ.
2. For every α⌢v ∈ T and for every m ∈ ω, the set of conditions p with
f pα(x) = v for some x > m is dense below pα.
3. For every α ∈ T and every v such that α⌢v ∈ ωn−1 \ T , if f pα(x) = v
for some condition p extending pα and some x, then x ∈ dom f pαα .
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We put strings α into T and define pα simultaneously. Initially, put λ ∈ T
and let pλ be the empty condition. Notice that properties 1–3 hold vacuously
at this point.
Next, assume we are at a point in the definition of T at which properties 1–
3 hold, and consider the length-lexicographically least α ∈ T with |α| < n−2
such that we have not yet put α⌢v into T for any v. Let β ∈ T be length-
lexicographically largest such that pβ has been defined. Let c : ω → ω
extend p and be sufficiently generic for the forcing notion Pω. If Player 1
plays (ω,P(ω)) and c on its first move, then the strategy for Player 2 makes
it play an instance f0 of stRT
1
<∞ in response. By property 2 and the genericity
of c, the set of x such that f0(x) = α(0) is infinite, so H0 = {x : f0(x) =
α(0)} is a legal second move for Player 1. Then the strategy for Player 2
makes it play another instance f1 of stRT
1
<∞ on its second move, and the set
H1 = {x : f1(x) = α(1)} will be infinite and hence a legal third move for
Player 1. Since n > |α|+ 2, if we continue in this way we analogously define
f0, . . . , f|α| and H0, . . . , H|α|−1, with fk played by Player 2 on its (k + 1)st
move for all k 6 |α|, and Hk played by Player 1 on its (k+2)nd move for all
k < |α|. Since the strategy for Player 2 is computable and hence continuous,
it is easy to see by induction that if q is any condition extended by c then
f qα↾k is an initial segment of fk, and H
p
α↾(k+1) is an initial segment of Hk. Now,
as f|α| is an instance of stRT
1
<∞, there must be a condition q0 extended by c
and a b ∈ ω such that f rα(x) < b for all x and all r extending q0.
We now decide for which v < b to add α⌢v to T and define pα⌢v. Fix
v, and suppose we have already decided this for all w < v. For notational
convenience, assume we have also defined an auxiliary condition qv extending
q0. If there is a condition r extending qv such that for every m ∈ ω, every
extension of r has a further extension s such that f sα(x) = v for some x > m,
then let α⌢v ∈ T and let pα⌢v = qv+1 = r. Otherwise, there is an extension
r of qv such that for every extension s of r, if f
s
α(x) = v for some x then x
is in the domain of f rα, and we let qv+1 = r and let α
⌢v /∈ T . It is readily
seen that this process adds α⌢v to T for at least one v, and for only finitely
many v, and that properties 1, 2, and 3 are preserved.
Let p∗ = pβ for the length-lexicographically largest β ∈ T . Let M be
as given by Lemma 6.5, and let S be the set of subsets of |M | that are ∆01-
definable over M . Every condition for Pω is also a condition for PM . So let c
be an instance of LH in S that extends p∗ and has no solution in S. For every
node α ∈ T , let Gα be the following run of a game. Player 1 plays (M,S)
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and c as its first move, and Player 2 plays according to its strategy. On its
(k + 1)st move for 0 < k 6 |α|, Player 1 always plays the set of all x ∈ M
that are colored α(k − 1) by the coloring played by Player 2 on its previous
move (assuming it played a total coloring and not just a partial one). We
claim that there is an α ∈ T of length n − 2 such that Player 1’s moves in
Gα are all legal. We argue by induction (along the standard number n − 1)
that for each k < n − 1 there is such an α ∈ T of length k. Suppose that
for some α ∈ T of length k − 1, Player 1’s moves in Gα are all legal. Then
on its (|α|+ 1)st move in Gα, Player 2 plays an instance f of stRT
1
<∞. Now,
property 3 in the definition of T is a Π01 statement of arithmetic, so since
M is a 1-elementary extension of ω, it must also hold in M . Thus, all the
v ∈M such that f−1(v) is unbounded in M must be among those for which
α⌢v ∈ T . Since there are only standardly many such v, there must be at
least one for which f−1(v) really is unbounded in M , so Player 1’s moves in
Gα⌢v will all be legal. This establishes the claim. To complete the proof, fix
such an α of length n − 2. All sets played by Player 1 are clearly in S, so
when Player 2 declares victory on its nth (i.e., (|α| + 2)nd) move in Gα it
must play a solution to c in S. But there is no such solution by hypothesis,
which is a contradiction.
7 Versions of Π01-bounding
In this section we fill out the picture of implications between versions of BΠ01
and related principles.
As with RT1<∞, we can define a strong form stBound
∗ of Bound∗ by having
the number of sets not be part of the instance. A convenient way to express
this problem is to say that an instance is an enumeration of a subset X of
N × N such that {n : ∃k (n, k) ∈ X} is bounded, and for each n, so is the
set {k : (n, k) ∈ X}; and a solution is a bound on {k : ∃n (n, k) ∈ X}. It is
easy to see that stBound∗ ≡W Bound, but we will see that this equivalence
no longer holds in our setting.
Another problem worth mentioning in this connection is CN, for which
an instance is an enumeration of the complement of a nonempty set X , and
a solution is an element of X . The finite parallelization C∗N is yet another
equivalent of BΣ02: In one direction, we can enumerate the sets {m : ∀k <
m¬ϕ(i, k)} for a given Π01 formula ϕ(i, k), and from a tuple containing an
element of the complement of each of these sets, obtain a common bound
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on the sets. In the other direction, given simultaneous enumerations of the
complements of the nonempty sets F0, . . . , Fn, by BΠ
0
1, there is a b such that
each Fi has an element less than b. Now bounded Π
0
1-comprehension, which
holds in RCA0, gives us the set of all tuples (a0, . . . , aj) with j 6 n and
ai ∈ Fi for all i 6 j, and set induction shows that there must be such a tuple
with j = n.
It is easy to see that CN ≡W C∗N, and Pauly, Fouche´, and Davie [29] showed
that Bound ≡W CN, using the Weihrauch equivalence between CN and its re-
striction UCN to enumerations of complements of singleton sets, which was
proved by Brattka, de Brecht, and Pauly [4]. Brattka and Rakotoniaina [7]
showed that CN |W RT
1
<∞ and CN <W stRT
1
<∞. Indeed, it is even the case
that RT12 
W CN; we will prove a stronger version of this fact below. It is
also worth noting that RT12 <W RT
1
3 <W · · · , as shown by Brattka and Rako-
toniaina [7] and Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17]. Thus we have the following
picture for Weihrauch reducibility:
stRT
1
<∞
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✂✂
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Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [17, Proposition 4.7] showed that RT1<∞ 6gW
RT
1
2, but their proof in fact shows that stRT
1
<∞ 6gW RT
1
2. On the other
hand, we have the following.
Proposition 7.1. RT12 
gW CN.
Proof. Suppose that RT12 6gW CN via a computable strategy P for Player 2.
As Player 1, we can begin to build a coloring c by coloring numbers in order,
initially giving each number the color 0, and simulate the action of P . We
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can assume that, even when provided with inputs that do not correspond to
a run of G(CN → RT
1
2), if P does not declare victory at a given move, then it
outputs an enumeration of the complement of some set, though in that case
the set might be empty.
Let Ai be the set whose complement is being enumerated by P as its
(i + 1)st move (if P has not declared victory at or before that move). We
guess at each stage that the least number ki currently in Ai is a solution to
the corresponding instance of CN and play that as our (i+ 2)nd move in the
simulation. If we ever find that ki is not in Ai, we restart the simulation (but
do not change c on the numbers at which we have already defined it). For
the least such i, say that i causes the simulation to restart. If the current
simulation is not restarted, then eventually P must declare victory at some
move, and declare some number m to be in the set it outputs at that move.
We then start to give our numbers the color 1− c(m). If we were to do this
forever, then m could not be part of a solution to c, so our current simulation
cannot be a true run of the game, and hence eventually some i must cause
it to restart.
Thus the simulation is restarted infinitely often. There are now two cases.
If there is a least i that causes the simulation to restart infinitely often,
then, by induction, k0, . . . , ki−1 have final values, and if we play c on our first
move, and then play these values in turn, we produce a run of our game in
which P ’s (i+1)st move is an enumeration of N, and hence is not an instance
of CN, which is a contradiction.
Otherwise, again by induction, all ki’s have final values, and if we play c
on our first move, and then play these values in turn, we produce a run of our
game in which P never declares victory, which is again a contradiction.
So for gW-reducibility, we have the following simpler picture:
stRT
1
<∞ ≡ RT
1
<∞ ≡ RT
1
2

CN ≡ C∗N ≡ Bound ≡ Bound
∗ ≡ stBound∗

LH ≡ 1
(7.2)
It is easy to check that all the Weihrauch reductions in Diagram (7.1)
still work over RCA0 + BΣ
0
2, so that diagram also reflects the relationships
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between these principles with respect to 6
RCA0 + BΣ02
W (or 6
Γ
W for any extension
Γ of RCA0+BΣ
0
2 by formulas true over the natural numbers). Diagram (7.2),
however, does change if we work over RCA0 + BΣ
0
2. We still have the equiv-
alence between RT1j and RT
1
k for j, k > 2 (which holds even over RCA0, with
the usual proof), but Corollary 4.3 shows that RT1<∞ 

RCA0 + BΣ02
gW RT
1
k for all
n and k. Similarly, we have the following.
Proposition 7.2. CN 
ngW RT
1
<∞ for all n, so if we let Γ consist of RCA0
together with all Π11 formulas true over the natural numbers then CN 

Γ
gW
RT
1
<∞.
Proof. Suppose that CN 6
n
gW RT
1
<∞ via a computable strategy P for Player 2.
We can assume that, even when provided with inputs that do not correspond
to a run of G(RT1<∞ → CN), if P does not declare victory at a given move,
then its output at that move, if nonempty, is a number k together with a
possibly partial c : N→ k.
For a possibly partial c : N→ k, let Hc = {c−1(0), . . . , c−1(k − 1)}. Note
that if c is total then at least one element of Hc is a solution to c as an
instance of RT1<∞. We can start building an instance E of CN by initially
not enumerating any numbers, and running simulations of possible runs of
G(RT1<∞ → CN) beginning with E, where each time P plays some c, we
play a simulation for each possible move for Player 1 in Hc. (Notice that c
might not actually be an instance of RT1<∞ because this simulation might
not correspond to an actual run of the game, but Hc is still finite. This is the
reason we could not work with stRT1<∞ here, because in that case P would
be able to play functions with unbounded range during simulations that do
not correspond to actual runs.)
Whenever in any of these simulations P declares victory at or before
the (n + 1)st move with a purported solution m, we enumerate m into E.
Since each Hc is finite, and we consider only finitely many c’s during this
construction, we enumerate only finitely many numbers into E, and this
strategy ensures that there is a run of G(RT1<∞ → CN) beginning with E in
which either P does not declare victory by its (n + 1)st move, or it does so
with a purported solution m that is enumerated into E, and hence is not in
fact a solution to E. In either case we have a contradiction.
The second part of the proposition now follows from Proposition 4.2.
Thus we have the following picture for gW-reducibility over RCA0 + BΣ
0
2
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(or over any extension of RCA0 + BΣ
0
2 by Π
1
1 formulas true over the natural
numbers):
stRT
1
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When working over RCA0, things change even further. We do still have
Bound ≡RCA0W CN, Bound
∗ ≡RCA0W C
∗
N, and CN 6
RCA0
W stRT
1
<∞, with essentially
the same proofs. The only parts that require a bit of care are CN 6
RCA0
W Bound
and C∗N 6
RCA0
W Bound
∗. We prove the latter, as the former is similar but
simpler. We argue in RCA0. Given an enumeration of the complements of
nonempty sets A0, . . . , An, constituting an instance of C
∗
N, we define enumer-
ations of sets F0, . . . , Fn by putting s into Fi whenever the least element m
i
s
of Ai at stage s of the enumeration of its complement leaves Ai at that stage.
If Fi were unbounded, then so would be the set of numbers m
i
s, since the
map taking Fi to this set is injective and computable. But then Ai would be
empty. So each Fi is bounded, and hence our enumeration of F0, . . . , Fn is an
instance of Bound∗. If s is a solution to this instance then for each i 6 n, the
least element of Ai at stage s must be in Ai, so from s we obtain a solution
to our instance of C∗N.
However, every instance of CN and Bound in every model of RCA0 has a
solution, while this is not the case for C∗N and Bound
∗, which are equivalent
to BΣ02 over RCA0 as statements of second-order arithmetic. So CN is strictly
below C∗N under both 6
RCA0
W and 6
RCA0
gW , and similarly for Bound and Bound
∗.
We also no longer have a Weihrauch-reduction of stBound∗ to Bound∗, but
do have one in two steps, because an instance of Bound∗ (or even Bound) can
be used to determine the number of sets being enumerated in an instance
of stBound∗, allowing us to solve that instance with a second application of
Bound
∗.
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Proposition 7.3. stBound∗ 6
RCA0,2
gW Bound
∗ but stBound∗ 
RCA0W Bound
∗.
Proof. Given an instance X of stBound∗, we can first build an instance of
Bound by enumerating n whenever X enumerates (n, k) for some k. Given
a solution b to this instance, we can build an instance of Bound∗ consisting
of enumerations of sets F0, . . . , Fb−1 by enumerating k into Fn whenever X
enumerates (n, k). A solution to this instance is also a solution to X .
For the second part, suppose that stBound∗ 6RCA0W Bound
∗ via Φe and
Φi. An enumeration E of ∅ is an instance of stBound
∗, so ΦEe must be an
instance of Bound∗. This instance has a fixed number of sets k, which must
be the same standard natural number no matter what model of RCA0 we are
working in, because the convergent computation over the standard natural
numbers still exists in any such model. Now let (M,S) be a model of RCA0
that contains an M-instance D of stBound∗ with no solution. We can delay
D to define a new M-instance D̂ of stBound∗ that enumerates the same set
as D but agrees with E up to the use of the part of the computation of ΦEe
that fixes the number of sets at k. Then D̂ has no solution, but ΦD̂e is an
instance of Bound∗ with a standard number of sets, and hence must have a
solution b. But then Φi should be able to compute a solution to D̂ from D̂
and b, which is a contradiction.
We can make the first part of this proposition a bit more precise by
using the compositional product from the theory of Weihrauch reducibility:
stBound
∗ 6RCA0W Bound
∗ ⋆ Bound.
The second part of the proposition easily generalizes to establish the
following useful principle (which we state for RCA0 but of course applies to
other systems as well).
Proposition 7.4. Let P and Q be Π12-problems such that
1. P has an ω-instance X such that for any finite initial segment σ of X,
there is a model (M,S) of RCA0 and an M-instance Y of P in S that
extends σ and has no solution in S; and
2. every instance X of Q includes a parameter kX ∈ N such that for every
model (M,S) of RCA0 and every M-instance X of Q in S, if kX is a
standard natural number, then X has a solution in S.
Then P 
RCA0W Q.
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As an example of the application of this principle, we have the following.
Corollary 7.5. LH 
RCA0W RT
1
<∞.
We also have the following other example of a W-reducibility that be-
comes a gW-reducibility in two steps when generalized to models of RCA0.
Proposition 7.6. stBound∗ 6
RCA0,2
gW stRT
1
<∞ but Bound
∗ 
RCA0W stRT
1
<∞.
Proof. For the first part, we argue in RCA0. Given an instance X of stBound
∗,
let Ei,n be the set of k such that (i, k) has been enumerated into X by stage
n, and let in be the least i that maximizes maxEi,n (which exists because the
function taking i to maxEi,n is computable). We first produce an instance
of stRT1<∞ by giving n the color in. Given a solution H to this instance, let
i be the color of the elements of H . Now apply Bound (which is W-reducible
over RCA0 to stRT
1
<∞) to obtain a bound b on {k : (i, k) ∈ X}. This bound
must be a solution to X , because if (j, k) ∈ X for some j and k > b, then
once (j, k) is enumerated into X at some stage m, we cannot have in = i for
n > m.
Now suppose that Bound∗ 6RCA0W stRT
1
<∞ via Φe and Φi. We work over
a model M of Σ01-PA that satisfies Σ
0
2-bounding but not Σ
0
3-bounding. Then
there is a ∆02 M-instance c : |M | → k of RT
1
<∞ with no solution. Say that sets
F0, . . . , Fk−1 are acceptable if c(n) = i for every i < k and n ∈ Fi. Notice
that in this case, each Fi is bounded, so an enumeration of an acceptable
family of sets is an M-instance of Bound∗.
Thinking of M-finite enumerations of acceptable families as a notion of
forcing, suppose that for each j ∈ M , the set of such enumerations E for
which some element greater than j is in the range of ΦEe is dense. Then we
can computably build an enumeration D of an acceptable family such that
ΦDe has unbounded range, and is thus not an instance of stRT
1
<∞. As this
situation cannot happen, there must be a j ∈M and anM-finite enumeration
E of an acceptable family such that for every enumeration D of an acceptable
family extending E, the range of ΦDe is bounded by j.
Now we start building such a D by monitoring Φ
D⊕Hp
i for each Hp = {n :
ΦDe (n) = p} with p <
M j. Whenever we see Φ
D⊕Hp
i return a number mp, we
enumerate mp + 1 into Fc(mp+1), where F0, . . . , Fk−1 is the family that D is
enumerating. The set of p <m j such that mp is ever defined is a bounded
Σ01 set, and the map taking each p in this set to mp is computable, so the set
of mp’s is M-finite. But then the restriction of c to this set is also M-finite,
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because the fact that M satisfies Σ02-bounding implies that the intersection
of a ∆02 set with an M-finite set is M-finite. So D is an M-finite extension
of the M-finite enumeration E, and hence is itself M-finite, and thus ΦDe
is a computable instance of stRT1<∞, and hence must have a solution. But
then some Hp with p <
M j must be such a solution, and hence Φ
D⊕Hp
i must
be a solution to D. But we ensured that this is not the case, so we have a
contradiction.
The first part of this proof shows more precisely that stBound∗ 6RCA0W
Bound ⋆ stRT1<∞ and that Bound
∗ 6RCA0W Bound ⋆ RT
1
<∞.
Combining the results above with Proposition 6.8 gives us the following
pictures of the 6RCA0W and 6
RCA0
gW cases, respectively.
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